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linux/lib/test_ubsan.c

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// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/module.h>
typedef void(*test_ubsan_fp)(void);
#define UBSAN_TEST(config, ...) do { \
pr_info("%s " __VA_ARGS__ "%s(%s=%s)\n", __func__, \
sizeof(" " __VA_ARGS__) > 2 ? " " : "", \
#config, IS_ENABLED(config) ? "y" : "n"); \
} while (0)
ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer In order to mitigate unexpected signed wrap-around[1], bring back the signed integer overflow sanitizer. It was removed in commit 6aaa31aeb9cf ("ubsan: remove overflow checks") because it was effectively a no-op when combined with -fno-strict-overflow (which correctly changes signed overflow from being "undefined" to being explicitly "wrap around"). Compilers are adjusting their sanitizers to trap wrap-around and to detecting common code patterns that should not be instrumented (e.g. "var + offset < var"). Prepare for this and explicitly rename the option from "OVERFLOW" to "WRAP" to more accurately describe the behavior. To annotate intentional wrap-around arithmetic, the helpers wrapping_add/sub/mul_wrap() can be used for individual statements. At the function level, the __signed_wrap attribute can be used to mark an entire function as expecting its signed arithmetic to wrap around. For a single object file the Makefile can use "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP_target.o := n" to mark it as wrapping, and for an entire directory, "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP := n" can be used. Additionally keep these disabled under CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST for now. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [1] Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2024-01-18 15:06:05 -08:00
static void test_ubsan_add_overflow(void)
{
volatile int val = INT_MAX;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer In order to mitigate unexpected signed wrap-around[1], bring back the signed integer overflow sanitizer. It was removed in commit 6aaa31aeb9cf ("ubsan: remove overflow checks") because it was effectively a no-op when combined with -fno-strict-overflow (which correctly changes signed overflow from being "undefined" to being explicitly "wrap around"). Compilers are adjusting their sanitizers to trap wrap-around and to detecting common code patterns that should not be instrumented (e.g. "var + offset < var"). Prepare for this and explicitly rename the option from "OVERFLOW" to "WRAP" to more accurately describe the behavior. To annotate intentional wrap-around arithmetic, the helpers wrapping_add/sub/mul_wrap() can be used for individual statements. At the function level, the __signed_wrap attribute can be used to mark an entire function as expecting its signed arithmetic to wrap around. For a single object file the Makefile can use "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP_target.o := n" to mark it as wrapping, and for an entire directory, "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP := n" can be used. Additionally keep these disabled under CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST for now. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [1] Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2024-01-18 15:06:05 -08:00
val += 2;
}
static void test_ubsan_sub_overflow(void)
{
volatile int val = INT_MIN;
volatile int val2 = 2;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer In order to mitigate unexpected signed wrap-around[1], bring back the signed integer overflow sanitizer. It was removed in commit 6aaa31aeb9cf ("ubsan: remove overflow checks") because it was effectively a no-op when combined with -fno-strict-overflow (which correctly changes signed overflow from being "undefined" to being explicitly "wrap around"). Compilers are adjusting their sanitizers to trap wrap-around and to detecting common code patterns that should not be instrumented (e.g. "var + offset < var"). Prepare for this and explicitly rename the option from "OVERFLOW" to "WRAP" to more accurately describe the behavior. To annotate intentional wrap-around arithmetic, the helpers wrapping_add/sub/mul_wrap() can be used for individual statements. At the function level, the __signed_wrap attribute can be used to mark an entire function as expecting its signed arithmetic to wrap around. For a single object file the Makefile can use "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP_target.o := n" to mark it as wrapping, and for an entire directory, "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP := n" can be used. Additionally keep these disabled under CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST for now. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [1] Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2024-01-18 15:06:05 -08:00
val -= val2;
}
static void test_ubsan_mul_overflow(void)
{
volatile int val = INT_MAX / 2;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer In order to mitigate unexpected signed wrap-around[1], bring back the signed integer overflow sanitizer. It was removed in commit 6aaa31aeb9cf ("ubsan: remove overflow checks") because it was effectively a no-op when combined with -fno-strict-overflow (which correctly changes signed overflow from being "undefined" to being explicitly "wrap around"). Compilers are adjusting their sanitizers to trap wrap-around and to detecting common code patterns that should not be instrumented (e.g. "var + offset < var"). Prepare for this and explicitly rename the option from "OVERFLOW" to "WRAP" to more accurately describe the behavior. To annotate intentional wrap-around arithmetic, the helpers wrapping_add/sub/mul_wrap() can be used for individual statements. At the function level, the __signed_wrap attribute can be used to mark an entire function as expecting its signed arithmetic to wrap around. For a single object file the Makefile can use "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP_target.o := n" to mark it as wrapping, and for an entire directory, "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP := n" can be used. Additionally keep these disabled under CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST for now. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [1] Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2024-01-18 15:06:05 -08:00
val *= 3;
}
static void test_ubsan_negate_overflow(void)
{
volatile int val = INT_MIN;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer In order to mitigate unexpected signed wrap-around[1], bring back the signed integer overflow sanitizer. It was removed in commit 6aaa31aeb9cf ("ubsan: remove overflow checks") because it was effectively a no-op when combined with -fno-strict-overflow (which correctly changes signed overflow from being "undefined" to being explicitly "wrap around"). Compilers are adjusting their sanitizers to trap wrap-around and to detecting common code patterns that should not be instrumented (e.g. "var + offset < var"). Prepare for this and explicitly rename the option from "OVERFLOW" to "WRAP" to more accurately describe the behavior. To annotate intentional wrap-around arithmetic, the helpers wrapping_add/sub/mul_wrap() can be used for individual statements. At the function level, the __signed_wrap attribute can be used to mark an entire function as expecting its signed arithmetic to wrap around. For a single object file the Makefile can use "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP_target.o := n" to mark it as wrapping, and for an entire directory, "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP := n" can be used. Additionally keep these disabled under CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST for now. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [1] Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2024-01-18 15:06:05 -08:00
val = -val;
}
static void test_ubsan_divrem_overflow(void)
{
volatile int val = 16;
volatile int val2 = 0;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_DIV_ZERO);
val /= val2;
}
static void test_ubsan_truncate_signed(void)
{
volatile long val = LONG_MAX;
volatile int val2 = 0;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_INTEGER_WRAP);
val2 = val;
}
static void test_ubsan_shift_out_of_bounds(void)
{
volatile int neg = -1, wrap = 4;
volatile int val1 = 10;
volatile int val2 = INT_MAX;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT, "negative exponent");
val1 <<= neg;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_SHIFT, "left overflow");
val2 <<= wrap;
}
static void test_ubsan_out_of_bounds(void)
{
ubsan: Fix panic from test_ubsan_out_of_bounds Running lib_ubsan.ko on arm64 (without CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) panics the kernel: [ 31.616546] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x158/0x158 [test_ubsan] [ 31.646817] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2 #1 PREEMPT [ 31.648153] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 31.648970] Call trace: [ 31.649345] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) [ 31.650960] dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84 [ 31.651559] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 31.652264] panic+0x138/0x3b4 [ 31.652812] __ktime_get_real_seconds+0x0/0x10 [ 31.653540] test_ubsan_load_invalid_value+0x0/0xa8 [test_ubsan] [ 31.654388] init_module+0x24/0xff4 [test_ubsan] [ 31.655077] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x280 [ 31.655680] do_init_module+0x58/0x2b4 That happens because the test corrupts other data in the stack: 400: d5384108 mrs x8, sp_el0 404: f9426d08 ldr x8, [x8, #1240] 408: f85f83a9 ldur x9, [x29, #-8] 40c: eb09011f cmp x8, x9 410: 54000301 b.ne 470 <test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x154> // b.any As there is no guarantee the compiler will order the local variables as declared in the module: volatile char above[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ volatile int arr[4]; volatile char below[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ There is another problem where the out-of-bound index is 5 which is larger than the extra surrounding memory for protection. So, use a struct to enforce the ordering, and fix the index to be 4. Also, remove some of the volatiles and rely on OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250415203354.4109415-1-smostafa@google.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-04-15 20:33:54 +00:00
int i = 4, j = 4, k = -1;
volatile struct {
char above[4]; /* Protect surrounding memory. */
int arr[4];
char below[4]; /* Protect surrounding memory. */
} data;
ubsan: Fix panic from test_ubsan_out_of_bounds Running lib_ubsan.ko on arm64 (without CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) panics the kernel: [ 31.616546] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x158/0x158 [test_ubsan] [ 31.646817] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2 #1 PREEMPT [ 31.648153] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 31.648970] Call trace: [ 31.649345] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) [ 31.650960] dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84 [ 31.651559] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 31.652264] panic+0x138/0x3b4 [ 31.652812] __ktime_get_real_seconds+0x0/0x10 [ 31.653540] test_ubsan_load_invalid_value+0x0/0xa8 [test_ubsan] [ 31.654388] init_module+0x24/0xff4 [test_ubsan] [ 31.655077] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x280 [ 31.655680] do_init_module+0x58/0x2b4 That happens because the test corrupts other data in the stack: 400: d5384108 mrs x8, sp_el0 404: f9426d08 ldr x8, [x8, #1240] 408: f85f83a9 ldur x9, [x29, #-8] 40c: eb09011f cmp x8, x9 410: 54000301 b.ne 470 <test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x154> // b.any As there is no guarantee the compiler will order the local variables as declared in the module: volatile char above[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ volatile int arr[4]; volatile char below[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ There is another problem where the out-of-bound index is 5 which is larger than the extra surrounding memory for protection. So, use a struct to enforce the ordering, and fix the index to be 4. Also, remove some of the volatiles and rely on OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250415203354.4109415-1-smostafa@google.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-04-15 20:33:54 +00:00
OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(i);
OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(j);
OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR(k);
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS, "above");
ubsan: Fix panic from test_ubsan_out_of_bounds Running lib_ubsan.ko on arm64 (without CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) panics the kernel: [ 31.616546] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x158/0x158 [test_ubsan] [ 31.646817] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2 #1 PREEMPT [ 31.648153] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 31.648970] Call trace: [ 31.649345] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) [ 31.650960] dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84 [ 31.651559] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 31.652264] panic+0x138/0x3b4 [ 31.652812] __ktime_get_real_seconds+0x0/0x10 [ 31.653540] test_ubsan_load_invalid_value+0x0/0xa8 [test_ubsan] [ 31.654388] init_module+0x24/0xff4 [test_ubsan] [ 31.655077] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x280 [ 31.655680] do_init_module+0x58/0x2b4 That happens because the test corrupts other data in the stack: 400: d5384108 mrs x8, sp_el0 404: f9426d08 ldr x8, [x8, #1240] 408: f85f83a9 ldur x9, [x29, #-8] 40c: eb09011f cmp x8, x9 410: 54000301 b.ne 470 <test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x154> // b.any As there is no guarantee the compiler will order the local variables as declared in the module: volatile char above[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ volatile int arr[4]; volatile char below[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ There is another problem where the out-of-bound index is 5 which is larger than the extra surrounding memory for protection. So, use a struct to enforce the ordering, and fix the index to be 4. Also, remove some of the volatiles and rely on OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250415203354.4109415-1-smostafa@google.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-04-15 20:33:54 +00:00
data.arr[j] = i;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOUNDS, "below");
ubsan: Fix panic from test_ubsan_out_of_bounds Running lib_ubsan.ko on arm64 (without CONFIG_UBSAN_TRAP) panics the kernel: [ 31.616546] Kernel panic - not syncing: stack-protector: Kernel stack is corrupted in: test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x158/0x158 [test_ubsan] [ 31.646817] CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 179 Comm: insmod Not tainted 6.15.0-rc2 #1 PREEMPT [ 31.648153] Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) [ 31.648970] Call trace: [ 31.649345] show_stack+0x18/0x24 (C) [ 31.650960] dump_stack_lvl+0x40/0x84 [ 31.651559] dump_stack+0x18/0x24 [ 31.652264] panic+0x138/0x3b4 [ 31.652812] __ktime_get_real_seconds+0x0/0x10 [ 31.653540] test_ubsan_load_invalid_value+0x0/0xa8 [test_ubsan] [ 31.654388] init_module+0x24/0xff4 [test_ubsan] [ 31.655077] do_one_initcall+0xd4/0x280 [ 31.655680] do_init_module+0x58/0x2b4 That happens because the test corrupts other data in the stack: 400: d5384108 mrs x8, sp_el0 404: f9426d08 ldr x8, [x8, #1240] 408: f85f83a9 ldur x9, [x29, #-8] 40c: eb09011f cmp x8, x9 410: 54000301 b.ne 470 <test_ubsan_out_of_bounds+0x154> // b.any As there is no guarantee the compiler will order the local variables as declared in the module: volatile char above[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ volatile int arr[4]; volatile char below[4] = { }; /* Protect surrounding memory. */ There is another problem where the out-of-bound index is 5 which is larger than the extra surrounding memory for protection. So, use a struct to enforce the ordering, and fix the index to be 4. Also, remove some of the volatiles and rely on OPTIMIZER_HIDE_VAR() Signed-off-by: Mostafa Saleh <smostafa@google.com> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250415203354.4109415-1-smostafa@google.com Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
2025-04-15 20:33:54 +00:00
data.arr[k] = i;
}
enum ubsan_test_enum {
UBSAN_TEST_ZERO = 0,
UBSAN_TEST_ONE,
UBSAN_TEST_MAX,
};
static void test_ubsan_load_invalid_value(void)
{
volatile char *dst, *src;
bool val, val2, *ptr;
enum ubsan_test_enum eval, eval2, *eptr;
unsigned char c = 0xff;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_BOOL, "bool");
dst = (char *)&val;
src = &c;
*dst = *src;
ptr = &val2;
val2 = val;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_ENUM, "enum");
dst = (char *)&eval;
src = &c;
*dst = *src;
eptr = &eval2;
eval2 = eval;
}
static void test_ubsan_misaligned_access(void)
{
volatile char arr[5] __aligned(4) = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5};
volatile int *ptr, val = 6;
UBSAN_TEST(CONFIG_UBSAN_ALIGNMENT);
ptr = (int *)(arr + 1);
*ptr = val;
}
static const test_ubsan_fp test_ubsan_array[] = {
ubsan: Reintroduce signed overflow sanitizer In order to mitigate unexpected signed wrap-around[1], bring back the signed integer overflow sanitizer. It was removed in commit 6aaa31aeb9cf ("ubsan: remove overflow checks") because it was effectively a no-op when combined with -fno-strict-overflow (which correctly changes signed overflow from being "undefined" to being explicitly "wrap around"). Compilers are adjusting their sanitizers to trap wrap-around and to detecting common code patterns that should not be instrumented (e.g. "var + offset < var"). Prepare for this and explicitly rename the option from "OVERFLOW" to "WRAP" to more accurately describe the behavior. To annotate intentional wrap-around arithmetic, the helpers wrapping_add/sub/mul_wrap() can be used for individual statements. At the function level, the __signed_wrap attribute can be used to mark an entire function as expecting its signed arithmetic to wrap around. For a single object file the Makefile can use "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP_target.o := n" to mark it as wrapping, and for an entire directory, "UBSAN_SIGNED_WRAP := n" can be used. Additionally keep these disabled under CONFIG_COMPILE_TEST for now. Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/26 [1] Cc: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org> Cc: Nathan Chancellor <nathan@kernel.org> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com> Reviewed-by: Marco Elver <elver@google.com> Reviewed-by: Justin Stitt <justinstitt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
2024-01-18 15:06:05 -08:00
test_ubsan_add_overflow,
test_ubsan_sub_overflow,
test_ubsan_mul_overflow,
test_ubsan_negate_overflow,
test_ubsan_truncate_signed,
test_ubsan_shift_out_of_bounds,
test_ubsan_out_of_bounds,
test_ubsan_load_invalid_value,
test_ubsan_misaligned_access,
};
/* Excluded because they Oops the module. */
static __used const test_ubsan_fp skip_ubsan_array[] = {
test_ubsan_divrem_overflow,
};
static int __init test_ubsan_init(void)
{
unsigned int i;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(test_ubsan_array); i++)
test_ubsan_array[i]();
return 0;
}
module_init(test_ubsan_init);
static void __exit test_ubsan_exit(void)
{
/* do nothing */
}
module_exit(test_ubsan_exit);
MODULE_AUTHOR("Jinbum Park <jinb.park7@gmail.com>");
MODULE_DESCRIPTION("UBSAN unit test");
MODULE_LICENSE("GPL v2");